This paper analyses optimal pollution abatement expenditure and the pricing of pollution under alternative social time preferences, including 'sustainable' preferences, defined as those that are consistent with two axioms of sustainable development introduced by Chichilnisky (1997). These axioms state essentially that neither the welfare of present nor future generations ought to be favoured over the other in determining the socially optimal path of economic development. The method is to calibrate a modified Ramsey model of optimal global growth and saving, where pollution is generated by the global output of goods and services. Pollution in turn reduces output. The simulation results illustrate how sensitive the optimal pollution price and abatement expenditure can be over time to assumptions about the social time preference rate. They also show that 'sustainable' preferences impose a lower burden on future generations in terms of the pollution price and abatement expenditure. Hence there is a case for governments to make explicit their value judgments about intergenerational welfare, in the context of their notion of sustainable development, when setting target pollution abatement levels and pollution prices over time.
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Introduction
Socially optimal pollution abatement depends on value judgements about the welfare of current relative to future generations, essentially because the costs fall on current generations for the benefit of future generations. Value judgements about intergenerational welfare are reflected in the choice of social time preference rates. This paper explores the impact of alternative social time preferences on socially optimal pollution abatement expenditure and the pollution price. In particular the traditional positive and constant pure social time preference rate (STPR) is compared with a form of 'sustainable preferences', following Chichilnisky (1997) 1 , Heal (1998) and Li and Lofgren (2000) . 'Sustainable preferences' satisfy two reasonable axioms of sustainable development, proposed by Chichilnisky (1997) , which together imply that neither the welfare of present nor future generations is favoured over the other. This contrasts with the implications of a constant time preference rate in which either the welfare of present or future generations dominates, depending on whether the constant time preference rate is positive or zero.
The method is to apply a calibrated Ramsey model of optimal global growth and saving, where pollution is generated by the global output of goods and services. The model takes the world economy as a single economy producing a single good that emits pollution.
The model is a simpler version of the Ramsey-based DICE 2 model used by Nordhaus (1992) -it has essentially the same social welfare function and aggregate production function as the DICE model but less sophisticated climate change-damage equations. Similarly to the DICE model, the model here does not consider energy use and pollution by country, industrial sector, type of energy or type of pollution. The focus here is on a generic pollutant and hence this is not an exercise in climate change modelling. Even in such a simple model the potential effects of social time preference rates depend on a complex interaction of parameters and are non-trivial in magnitude.
The model applied in this paper has similarities with other models that introduce the optimal control of pollution into a classic Ramsey model. Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991) show how the socially optimal level of abatement and can be achieved using Pigouvian taxes.
Other studies have focused on the optimal path of a pollution tax, such as Ulph and Ulph 1 Chichilnisky (1997) introduces the term 'sustainable preferences' but suggests, as an alternative, a term introduced by Robert Solow: 'intertemporally equitable preferences'. 2 DICE stands for Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy which is an intertemporal general equilibrium model of climate change and economic growth.
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(1994), Sinclair (1994) and Farzin (1996) . Guest (2010) focuses on the effect of demographic change on the optimal carbon price. None of these models, however, consider the effect of social value judgements implicit the social rate of time preference in determining optimal pollution abatement expenditure. This is done here by comparing outcomes under a positive and constant pure time preference rate with those under social preferences based on a form suggested by Li and Lofgren (2000) in which neither the present nor the future is favoured over the other, and which therefore satisfy Chichilnisky's (1997) axioms of sustainable development. It contrasts with the typical approach in which either the present or the future dominates, depending on whether the social time preference rate is positive or zero.
Comparisons are also made with the use of a logistic function for the social time preference rate.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses alternative social time preferences. Section 3 describes the simulation model, more detail of which is given in Appendix B. Section 4 presents the results of the simulations including a sensitivity analysis, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Alternative social time preferences
'Sustainable' preferences
The standard case of a constant social time preference rate (STPR) implies an asymmetric treatment of the welfare of generations. A constant zero rate leads to a "dictatorship" (Chichilnisky, 1997) by distant future generations since the sum of the utilities of infinite future generations always dominates the utility of the present generation.
Conversely a constant positive discount rate implies a "dictatorship" by present generations since the discounted value of future period utility eventually becomes zero. Chichilnisky (1997) proposes two axioms that overcome the "dictatorship" problem and hence provide a more intergenerationally equitable basis for sustainable development.
"Axiom 1 requires that the present should not dictate the outcome in disregard for the future:
it requires sensitivity to the welfare of generations in the distant future. Axiom 2 requires that the welfare criterion should not be dictated by the long-run future, and thus requires sensitivity to the present" (Chichilnisky, 1997, p.469) . These axioms imply "sustainable preferences" (p.468). Declining weights are attached to period utility over time and then an extra weight is attached to utility in the last period. Li and Lofgren (2000) suggest an alternative approach which assumes that society consists of two types of individual, one of 3 which discounts future utility while the other does not. The social welfare function is a weighted average of the two intertemporal utilities. Both the approach in Chichilnisky (1997) and Li and Lofgren (2000) result in hyperbolic STPRs. Hyperbolic discounting in the context of individual behaviour has attracted considerable support, both theoretical and experimental;
see Laibson (1996) and the survey by Loewenstein et al. (2003) . It reflects decreasing impatience as intertemporal choices become more distant. This paper applies the following social welfare function which is similar to that in Li and Lofgren (2000) and results in a hyperbolic STPR:
where V 1 and V 2 are the intertemporal utilities of individuals of type 1 and 2, respectively; N t is the number of individuals of each type, assumed equal; and α is a social welfare weight attached to the intertemporal utility of the type 1 individual. The individual of type 1 discounts the future at a constant rate of time preference and individual of type 2 does not discount the future (or, equivalently, adopts a zero constant rate of time preference); and T is the planning horizon.
Logistic preferences
A characteristic of both hyperbolic and constant preferences is that they imply utility weights which decline at a decreasing rate ( Figure 2b) ; that is, the second derivative with respect to time is positive. There are infinitely many possible time paths of utility weights.
One such alternative path is represented by a logistic time preference function which reflects the notion of reverse time inconsistency or increasing impatience. First introduced by Loewenstein (1987) , increasing impatience has found some theoretical and empirical support; (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005; Bommier, 2006) and the utility from the anticipation or 'savouring' of the future consumption (Loewenstein, 1987) . In an intergenerational framework one can intuitively think of a grandmother caring almost as much about the well-being of her grandchildren as she does about her own children. But her concern for the well-being of more distant descendants may begin to decline at an increasing rate. A social planner could reflect these individual preferences by attaching less weight to generations in the far distant future than to those in the near future. This would imply a STPR that remains low for an initial period then increases 4 quite sharply to a long run level. A logistic function is adopted to capture such a pattern of intertemporal preferences:
where  t is the STPR,  and x are constants, and T is a distant planning horizon. Figure 1a compares the STPR over time for three alternative models of social preferences: a constant STPR (=1.0), hyperbolic STPR (with =0.5) and logistic preferences. Figure 1b compares the corresponding discount factors, defined as   
The simulation model
All individuals derive utility from a consumption good, c. 
The parameter,  t , represents the pure rate of time preference of the type 1 individuals. It is constant over time except in the case of logistic preferences as discussed below.
The social welfare function (1) can be shown to imply a hyperbolic effective social rate of time preference; see Appendix A for the discrete time case and Li and Lofgren (2000) for the continuous time case. The rate of decline of the effective social rate of time preference depends on the consumption shares of the two individuals which in turn depend on the planner's preference parameter, .
The utility function   t Uc is assumed to be the isoelastic form for both individuals of type j (j=1,2):
where A t is total factor productivity which grows at an exogenous rate, a. The capital stock evolves according to
where K t is the stock of capital, I
t is the flow investment and  is the rate of depreciation of capital.
The net flow of pollution is a function of output of goods and services and the units of output allocated to pollution abatement:
where D t is the flow of pollution during period t , Y t is output, B t is pollution abatement expenditure 3 ,  is a scaling parameter, and  and  are, respectively, the output and abatement elasticity of pollution flow. The stock of pollution evolves according to
where S t is the stock of pollution and  is the natural rate of absorption of pollution from the atmosphere.
A closed economy is assumed implying:
c N . The social planner maximises a Lagrangian subject to the above constraints:
where λ t and  t are the shadow prices of capital and pollution, respectively. The two equations of motion governing the path of the shadow price of emissions (hereafter the pollution price) are 6 (11) and (12) where D Y,t is the marginal pollution from output, Y S,t is the marginal damage from pollution, and Y K,t is the marginal product of capital. For intuition, the term (11) and (12) is the net shadow price of a unit of capital, where is the marginal externality cost from a unit of capital and is subtracted because the future output that could be generated from a unit of capital causes pollution which has an externality cost of (see also Guest, 2010) . 4 The shadow price of capital declines over time because a unit of capital can generate output in all future periods and therefore a new unit of capital is more valuable if created today than in the future. This standard result has an analogy with the shadow price of pollution, as discussed below.
Social time preferences, abatement and the pollution price
Equation (11) gives the time path of the socially optimal price of pollution,  t . Two factors put upward pressure, and one factor puts downward pressure, on the pollution price over time. Downward pressure comes from the marginal damage function, Y S,t , which is negative and therefore decreases the pollution price over time. The reason is analogous to that for the decline in the shadow price of capital over time -that is, a unit of pollution emitted today does more aggregate harm over all time periods than a unit of pollution emitted in the future. Hence the shadow price, or externality cost, of a unit of pollution emitted today is higher than that of a unit emitted tomorrow. Note that the externality cost is reduced by the term because the damage to output in turn lowers future pollution.
Upward pressure on the path of the pollution price derives from two factors: the natural rate of absorption () and the rate of return on capital, Y K,t , because both factors reduce the future output costs of current pollution. The rate of absorption does so directly by reducing the physical stock of pollution. The return on capital is the discount rate that applies to future damages. Hence a higher return on capital lowers the present value of future 4 The inequality
holds for any plausible parameterisation, otherwise it would imply that the pollution damages from future output are so costly that it is not worth saving to increase future output.
damages which reduces the shadow price of current pollution relative to future pollution and therefore lowers the current pollution price relative to the future price -hence tending to increase the pollution price over time. 5 Optimal pollution abatement expenditure at any time t is determined by the first order condition (see Appendix B) that the marginal cost of abatement equals the marginal benefit:
where  t ,the shadow price of capital, is the marginal cost of abatement, since output allocated to abatement could have been allocated to investment in physical capital or consumption. The path of  t is driven by the marginal product of capital, Y K . The right hand side of (13) 
which indicates that marginal damages depend on the pollution intensity of output (Y/S) and the elasticity of output with respect to pollution, . The higher is (Y/S) t the greater is the damage caused by a given increase in pollution.
The STPR affects abatement expenditure and the pollution price primarily through the rate of return on capital, Y K,t , which is given by
The STPR affects saving which drives the capital labour ratio (K/L). The higher is (K/L) t the lower is Y K,t and the higher the pollution price at time t. The STPR affects abatement, B t , over time as follows. The higher the STPR, the lower the saving and future capital stock which in turn implies a higher future marginal product of capital, Y K,t . Hence the shadow price of capital (λ t , or the marginal cost of abatement) falls more steeply (12), implying a lower future cost of abatement relative to current cost. This puts upward pressure on the abatement level over time. The higher future Y K,t also drives the pollution price over time because it implies a higher discount rate on future damages from current emissions. Hence the higher the STPR the lower the discounted externality cost of current emissions relative to future emissions, implying a lower current pollution price relative to the future price -that is, upward pressure on the pollution price. To summarise in more simple intuitive terms, a higher STPR implies more regard for the welfare of current relative to future generations which shifts abatement expenditure and the pollution price to the future.
The aim of the simulations is to determine the order of magnitude of these effects for the following alternative social time preference functions are simulated: 
Simulations
Simulation method
The aim is to simulate the optimal response to a pollution "shock" under the three alternative models of social preferences. In the pre-shock scenario, there is a steady stock of pollution calibrated to 1 (S=1), zero abatement expenditure and a constant pollution price. An pollution shock occurs that initially requires optimal abatement expenditure of 1 per cent of GDP (B=0.01Y) (see Appendix B for parameterisation and details of solution method). All three models of social preferences are calibrated to give this same initial abatement expenditure and also the same initial pollution price. The difference in the three preferences models is in the way abatement expenditure and pollution price evolve over time, which is determined by the equations of motion, (11) and (12).
Returning to Figure 1a , in the case where =1.0 which implies the traditional assumption of constant STPR, the STPR is 0.029 per annum in the baseline case (footnote 6). This is also by definition the pure rate of time preference of the type 1 individual since the type 2 individual is disregarded. In the case of the hyperbolic ('sustainable') preferences case, where =0.5, the STPR starts at the same level as in the constant STPR case, 0.029, then declines monotonically. Starting the STPR at 0.029 is achieved by setting the pure rate of time preference of the type 1 individual,  t , at 0.058, which is twice the rate that it is in the constant STPR case. 7 If alternatively  t were to be kept at 0.0289, the STPR would start at half of 0.0289. This does not seem like a sensible comparison. Another alternative would have been to start the hyperbolic STPR at a higher level than 0.0289 but this would arguably require an implausibly high rate of pure time preference for the type 1 individual. A sensitivity simulation is conducted for a very low (0.001) pure rate of time preference for the type 1 individual producing a very low STPRs for all preference paths. This has a significant impact on the results (see Section 5).
7 From Appendix A, the STPR at time t is equal to ρ t (1-C 2,t /C t ), where C 2,t /C t is the consumption of the type 2 individual as a share of total consumption. This share is initially equal to the value of α (0.5 in the simulation) which implies that they start with equal consumption shares. Hence if ρ t =0.058, the initial STPR is equal to 0.0289 after which it declines.
Simulation results
Figures 2 and 3 plot the paths of two key variables that drive the results: the marginal product of capital, Y K,t , and the shadow price of capital,  t , which is the marginal cost of abatement. The path for Y K,t is higher for the constant STPR case than in the other two cases (Figure 2 ), due to the higher values of the STPR (Figure 1a ). This implies that the shadow price of capital falls more steeply for the constant STPR case than for the other two cases (Figure 3) , as discussed above. Consequently the future cost of abatement is lower relative to the current cost, putting upward pressure on the abatement level over time in the constant STPR case compared with the other cases. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , which shows that after 100 years abatement expenditure is 4 per cent of GDP in the constant STPR case compared with 1 per cent under the other two cases. Abatement expenditure has been shifted to the future more in the constant STPR case than in the case of hyperbolic preferences.
Under hyperbolic preferences the STPR declines over time which dampens the upward slope of the pollution price and abatement level. In this way the burden of abatement on future generations is relatively lower than it is under the constant STPR case. This result accords with intuition: hyperbolic ('sustainable') preferences benefit future generations compared with the traditional model of a constant STPR. The degree to which this occurs depends on the initial level of the STPR and the rate at which it declines. In these simulations the STPR for the hyperbolic preferences always lies below that for the constant STPR for reasons given in Section 5.1. If the whole path of the STPR under hyperbolic preferences were to be shifted upwards the benefit to future generations would be less. Similarly if the STPR path were to be lower the benefit to future generations would be greater. This is borne out in a sensitivity simulation (discussed further below and illustrate in Table 1 ) where pure rate of time preference for the type 1 individual is close to zero (0.001). This means that the STPR path under hyperbolic preferences starts at this value and asymptotes to zero, producing a much flatter and lower path which is very close to that in the constant STPR case. The result is that the abatement paths are very similar for the hyperbolic and constant STPR cases. This suggests the average level of the STPR is more than the intertemporal path of the STPR, which is further borne out by the comparison with logistic preferences (below). Under logistic preferences, the STPR rises over time but from a low level which is, for an initial period, below the STPR under hyperbolic preferences and remains below the STPR in the constant STPR case. The path for Y K,t falls below that for hyperbolic preferences for an initial period, and hence the shadow price of capital is higher (Figure 3) , the future cost of abatement is higher and future abatement lower, than in the hyperbolic preferences case. The low initial STPR means that, like the hyperbolic preferences case, future generations bear a lower burden than under a constant STPR.
There is however relatively little difference between the paths of abatement and the pollution price under logistic preferences and hyperbolic preferences. This is because the paths of the STPR cross over and in fact the average STPR is close, which is evident from inspection of Figure 1a . The results here suggest that the average level of the STPR is more important than the pattern in driving the paths of abatement and the pollution price. Table 1 provides a sensitivity analysis with respect to some key parameters. The rate of time preference and elasticity of marginal utility are simulated in combination in Table 1, since they jointly determine an initial pre-pollution steady state and also in terms of their inferences about equity (see Appendix B). The first alternative combination of these two parameters in Table 1 consists of a lower level of the STPR, achieved by adopting a lower rate of pure time preference of the type 1 individual:  =0.001 which is the value in Stern (2007), and the value of  that is consistent with the initial steady state, giving =3.75 which is higher than Stern's value of =1. The remaining parameters in Table 1 (Table 1) , consistent with the discussion in Section 4. The parameter η, the elasticity of output with respect to the stock of pollution, is given a value of 12 0.02 in the base case, implying that a 100 per cent increase in pollution would reduce GDP by 2 per cent. This is based on Stern (2007) who notes that most formal models assume that 2 to 3 degrees of global warming, which would occur if there were a 100 per cent increase (at least) in the stock of pollution, would reduce global GDP by between zero and 3 per cent permanently (the value assumed here of 2 per cent is in the middle of this range). The lower value for sensitivity analysis of 0.01 is chosen on the basis that advances in adaptation could reduce the sensitivity of output to pollution.
The baseline results and the associated analysis broadly speaking hold up to the sensitivity tests. The most notable divergence from the baseline simulation outcomes is in the simulation of a lower STPR, represented by a value of 0.001 in the constant STPR case.
Because the hyperbolic STPR starts at this level and cannot fall below zero it has a much flatter shape and ranges from 0.001 to zero over time. The same applies to the STPR under logistic preferences. This produces abatement paths and pollution prices that are very similar in all three preference models (Table 1) . This illustrates the point that it is the average level of the STPR that matters for intergenerational burden of abatement; and that the particular preference model chosen matters more the higher the average level of the STPR over time.
For the other sensitivity tests with respect to other parameter values (and returning the STPRs to the baseline paths), the baseline result carries over -that is, future generations are more heavily burdened by abatement expenditure and the pollution price under the STPR case than under either hyperbolic preferences or logistic preferences.
Conclusion
There are two broad implications from these results. One is that reasonable axioms for sustainable development, captured here through the model for 'sustainable' preferences, result in a lower burden on future generations through a lower pollution price and lower abatement levels. The second is that social value judgements, implicit in STPRs, can have significant effects on the path of optimal pollution abatement and the path of the optimal pollution price.
The average level of the STPR over time, rather than the pattern, is more important for the abatement path and pollution price path, according to the simulations. It follows from these results that policy makers, in setting targets for pollution prices and abatement expenditure, are implicitly adopting social time preferences which imply a view about sustainable development and intergenerational equity. There is a case for making explicit rather than implicit value judgements about intergenerational equity, along with a clearly defined notion 13 of sustainable development, in setting targets for pollution prices and abatement expenditures over time.
While the simple Ramsey model applied here is a transparent way of illustrating orders of magnitude of the effects of social time preference assumptions, it fails to capture a number of effects of consumers and firms on the pollution price and abatement. These include substitution by firms among technologies with different energy intensities, substitution by consumers among goods with different energy intensities, the effect of uncertainty, and the impact of future catastrophic events which have low probability but would cause substantial damage. These caveats should be borne in mind in interpreting the results. 
Therefore, substituting for marginal utilities and rearranging gives: 
Finally, substituting for
The term 
which, substituting into (A8), implies that the social rate of time preference is hyperbolic and asymptotes to zero over time (which is the result, for the continuous time case, in Li and Lofgren, 2000, p. 238) .
where λ t and  t are the shadow prices of capital and pollution, respectively. 
where a is the rate of neutral technical progress 
Given the production function: The model is calibrated in order to generate plausible paths for the stock of pollution and the cost of abatement. Taking CO 2 pollution as an example, the analysis in Stern (2007) is used to provide some parameter values. An exception is the rate of time preference for which the value in Stern has been widely criticised for being too low, and more importantly, inconsistent with the value of the elasticity of marginal utility. The baseline value of the rate of time preference here is somewhat higher than that in Stern, but Stern's value is simulated as part of the sensitivity analysis. The baseline parameter values are given in Table B1 .
The partial elasticity of pollution flow with respect to output, , is assumed to be 0.8 which is the approximate value for the world between 2000 and 2005 (Garnaut, 2008, p.90) .
The rate of natural decay of pollution, ε, is set at 0.005 which is about one third of the rate of output-induced pollution growth and which is consistent with estimates in (Stern, 2007) . The elasticity of pollution flow with respect to abatement expenditure is 0.8 which by assumption is the same as the elasticity of pollution flow with respect to output.
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The capital elasticity of output, , is equal to 0.25 and the elasticity of marginal utility, , is equal to 1; both are typical values and the latter is also adopted by Stern (2007) 
